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ABSTRACT 
 
Protecting the confidentiality of a patient's information in a shared care environment could 
become a complex task. Correct identification of users, assigning of access permissions, and 
resolution of conflict rise as main points of interest in providing solutions for data exchange 
among health care providers. Traditional approaches such as Mandatory Access Control, 
Discretionary Access control and Role-Based Access Control policies do not always provide a 
suitable solution for health care settings, especially for shared care environments. The core of this 
contribution consists in the description of an approach which uses attribute-based encryption to 
protect the confidentiality of patients’ information during the exchange of electronic health 
records among healthcare providers. Attribute-based encryption allows the reinforcing of access 
policies and reduces the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive information; it also provides a set 
of functionalities which are described using a case study. Attribute-based encryption provides an 
answer to restrictions presented by traditional approaches and facilitate the reinforcing of existing 
security policies over the transmitted data. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In a shared care paradigm, remote access to distant data repositories along with the exchange of 
relevant electronic health records (EHRs) becomes essential for providing integral health care 
services. Internet is the natural platform to support such functionalities. However, the insecure 
nature of the network and the increased amount of health information transmitted through it raise 
the concern over the secure exchange of EHRs (Ohno-Machadoa, Silveira, & Vinterbo, 2004). In 
fact, the disclosure, transmission and use of patient’s data for delivering health care services are 
an expanding practice that concerns the interest of health institutions, physicians and patients. In a 
dynamic and demanding environment, such as health care, a patient’s confidentiality can only be 
guaranteed by incorporating security services and mechanisms along with common security 
policies and/or conflict resolution policies to protect the data at any given point(Lopez & Blobel, 
2009). Additionally, EHR systems not only should assure the protection of patients’ privacy and 
confidentiality but also guarantee the reliability and integrity of the information gathered by 
health care professionals (Conrick & Newell, 2006). Therefore, it is essential that health 
information systems consider the privacy and integrity of the data and also allow the safe retrieval 
of information for primary and secondary uses, especially in an interconnected health information 
scenario (Lusignan, Chan, Theadom, & Dhoul, 2007).   
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In this context, projects centered in the interconnection of health information systems, such as 
national health information initiatives or multi-domain EHR systems, not only confront 
information and functional requirements, such as the development and implementation of 
standardized communication protocols, standardized vocabulary and homogeneous development 
frameworks, but also privacy and security requirements. Protection of a patient’s privacy and the 
secure disclosure of health information are crucial functionalities that should be embedded within 
the specifications of modern and reliable electronic health record systems (Conrick & Newell, 
2006; Ohno-Machadoa, et al., 2004; Safran, et al., 2007). Moreover, to guarantee the secure 
transmission and release of health information in a shared care paradigm, the protection of a 
patient’s privacy has to be conceived as an issue which combines the secure transmission of data, 
correct user authentication, access control and security policies, either at the point of origin or at 
the destination of the communication channel. 
 
During the exchange of EHRs, even when the transmission has been between trusted parties, 
access permission can be violated under specific circumstances. Consider a scenario in which 
health care institutions A and B are trusted parties during the exchange of information. Using 
public key technologies both institutions can transmit information using a secure channel. The 
secure channel guarantees confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted information. However, 
the existence of different access policies may lead to a violation of access permissions either at 
the point of origin or when the information reaches its destination. Blobel et al. have suggested 
the definition of common domain policies to address differences or conflicts rising from 
disparities in the definition of security and access policies existing among health care 
organizations (Blobel, Nordberg, Davis, & Pharow, 2006). However, implementing this approach 
requires the existence of standardized vocabularies and common policy structures, which is 
limited in the actual health information infrastructure. There is also a virtual agreement that for 
communication of medical information and posterior access to the data, access policies based on 
role-based access control models may facilitate the overcoming of possible violation of access 
permission (Blobel, et al., 2006; Gritzalis & Lambrinoudakis, 2004). However, role-based access 
control models also present issues that may increase the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive 
medical data (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2008). 
 
This chapter aims to address the issues of secure transmission of data, access control and user 
privileges and propose a specification for an information exchange model that allows a secure and 
safe approach for the exchange and release of EHR in a shared care scenario. Assuming that 
transmission of medical information is maintained over insecure channels, we propose a policy 
reinforcement model based on attribute-based encryptions and incorporate security mechanisms 
in order to protect patients’ privacy during the exchange and release of the information.  
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Electronic health record should not only be considered as a replacement for paper-based medical 
records but also means to facilitate the quicker/easier access to relevant health information. EHRs 
also facilitate the implementation of information architectures to provide support to shared care 
environments, where communication between the staff involved in imparting care to a patient as 
well as remote access to data repositories are essential activities. In general, the historical 
information maintained within the health repositories can also be used as a supporting and 
knowledge base for continuing treatment of the patient, a base of information for further 
treatment of the same patient, and base-knowledge for advanced research and medical education.  
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Security and privacy of patients’ EHRs 
 
The nature of a medical record can be described as information provided by a uniquely vulnerable 
human being, worried in some manner about the core of his/her very existence, to a trusted person 
with superior knowledge (Eddy, 2000). In fact, modern electronic health records contain 
extremely personal and sensitive information regarding not only health history but also the 
dietary habits, sexual orientation, sexual activities, employment status, income, eligibility for 
public assistance and family history of a patient (Choi, Capitan, Krause, & Streeper, 2006). 
Therefore, sharing EHRs raises concerns over the legal and ethical implications associated to the 
unauthorized access and release of personal information, and the effects that this may cause to the 
patient (Anderson, 2007; Conrick & Newell, 2006). Patients understand the importance of 
retaining medical information to support and improve the delivery of health care even when they 
recognize both the sensitive nature of the collected data and the fact that information contended 
by computerized health information system becomes more accessible to health professional, 
administrative and medical staff, and third parties (Conrick & Newell, 2006). Patients expect 
secure health information systems in which personal data is protected and any disclosed 
information would be used only for health care purposes (Grain, 2006). 
 
Safe access and exchange of electronic health information requires not only the secure 
transmission of data but also to ensure that information will be disclosed only to those with the 
correct access privileges. This implies that protection of patients’ privacy needs to be conserved 
at the source point, when it is transmitted and when it reaches the destination point. In order to 
protect sensitive medical data, the principles of “need to know” and relevance apply. Under this 
premise users should be allowed to access a patient's EHR in order to obtain the relevant 
information to carry out a task in concordance with the access and security policies of the 
organization in which the patient has been treated (Blobel, 2004; Garson & Adams, 2008). The 
principle of need-to-know is driven by the relevance that the accessed information has in the 
support of the patient care. However, relevancy is an ambiguous concept that depends on the 
context in which the information is generated and the purposes for which the data has been 
released. Consequently, the information accessed by a physician should be relevant but also 
sufficient to provide health care services (van der Linden, Kalra, Hasman, & Talmon, 2009).  
 
Securing medical information is not only a social, ethical and technological matter, but is also 
about the establishment of well defined privacy policies and legislation. The legal duty of 
confidentiality is embedded in the professional relationship between physician and patient, and 
therefore, an essential aspect to be considered when exchanging medical records. From a 
perspective in which the mobility of patients as well as the exchange of information becomes 
more usual, the definition of means to protect the privacy and confidentiality of the patients in an 
efficient way becomes even more necessary. Both security services and mechanisms are essential 
for allowing access to authorized users as well as for protecting sensitive medical information 
during the exchange of data (Blobel, et al., 2006). Therefore, it is essential for health information 
systems to consider both the protection and privacy of patient’s data but also the safe and 
authorized retrieval of information. At this point, it is important to consider that adding excessive 
security measures could lead to an inefficient, more time demanding and less user friendly access 
control methods. Defining the correct balance between security requirement and availability of 
information is a critical goal in a complex environment such as health care (Lopez & Blobel, 
2009). 
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Security and privacy in a shared care paradigm 
 
In a shared care environment, different health care units (HCU) are involved in the care process 
as well as in maintaining accurate medical records. Indeed, in modern healthcare environments 
different care services are offered by different HCU within the organization or in a healthcare 
network that involves multiple organizations. This requires the communication and cooperation 
among all actors involved in the administration of patients’ care (Choi, et al., 2006). Internet turns 
into a natural environment for such functionalities by allowing the exchange of EHRs and the 
interconnection of medical applications, thus facilitating better management of medical services 
as well as faster treatment of patients (Gritzalis & Lambrinoudakis, 2004).  
 
As in paper-based health records, physicians have an ethical obligation of protecting patient 
information in order to prevent potential harm to an individual. Nevertheless, the nature of EHRs 
has transformed the duty of physician-patient confidentiality to a complex task. Despite the 
personal nature of health records, EHRs make patient’s information potentially available to 
anyone with access to a health information system (Anderson, 2007). Therefore, the 
responsibility of protecting patient privacy has moved from an individual/local responsibility to a 
duty shared among the different entities that share the information. This tendency is altering the 
preexisting conception of the doctor–patient confidentiality and is threatening the quality of 
health care (Choi, et al., 2006). These apprehensions are also shared by the public whose primary 
concern is the security, privacy, confidentiality and protection of their personal health information 
(Goldschmidt, 2005; Rash, 2005). 
 
In a shared care paradigm defining what is considered sensitive information as well as what 
access permissions are granted to users become uncertain. In fact, each participating institution of 
a health network would have different approaches for defining the level of sensitivity associated 
to the information, access rights and the level of security required to protect privacy of patients 
(Blobel, et al., 2006). Those approaches not only depend on legal restrictions but also are built 
based on the accumulated experience and the culture of organizations. Since the conception of 
security and protection of patient’s privacy differ from one organization to another, methods for 
interconnecting health information systems should include comprehensive understanding of the 
complexity of requirements involving the secure exchange and release of medical data. In 
general, an electronic health record system able to secure and protect the confidentiality of 
patients should not only incorporate security requirements but also guarantee the flow and 
availability of the information. 
 
Implementing a shared care environment has several implications not only in how the 
information is managed or which technology can be used but also in the way in which 
information is collected, stored and accessed. The exchange of information in a shared care 
environment exceeds the needs of a locally integrated health information system and requires the 
definition of a new set of requirements. Even more, it requires a different approach to overcoming 
the technical, legal and ethical issues that rise from exchanging highly sensitive information. In a 
shared care paradigm, the number of specialist that can have access to EHRs increases and the 
information contained by EHRs can be broken down among different health information systems 
within the organization or among different healthcare providers, increasing the possibility of a 
security breach. In general, the implementation of the share care paradigm not only requires the 
support of standardized information systems architectures, data exchange protocols and common 
vocabularies but also protecting the privacy of patients, guaranteeing the authorized access to 
stored data and protecting the integrity of the information (Blobel, et al., 2006). 
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Securing the exchange of EHRs 
 
Secure exchange and disclosure of electronic health records over insecure channels such as 
internet requires the implementation of comprehensive security policies and technologies that 
allows the exchange of data whilst the protection of patient’s privacy is guaranteed (Choe & Yoo, 
2007). These policies and technologies should provide mechanisms for access control and define 
access privileges for information management and protection of data privacy (Blobel, et al., 2006; 
Ohno-Machadoa, et al., 2004). During the electronic exchange of medical data, patient’s sensitive 
information always has to be protected; especially the information considered sensitive due to the 
legal and ethical consequences that unauthorized releases could carry. The unauthorized access 
and release of sensitive information are considered a breach of confidentiality and could lead to 
issues of public concern such as discrimination, embarrassment or economic harm (Ohno-
Machadoa, et al., 2004). At this point, several issues have to be considered: (1) the origin of the 
information, (2) the reason for its release, (3) secure transmission of data and (4) protection of 
patient’s privacy. 
 
The origin of the information refers to who and where the data has been collected. Health 
information can be collected by different organizations and can serve a variety of purposes, and 
its storage can be local or external.  Information locally stored can be promptly available and can 
normally be accessed by user at any time and location within the organization. On the contrary, 
external health data is usually retrieved from information systems that do not provide direct 
access rights to users. In this case, access rights are provided based on common agreements 
between the organizations involved (Lopez & Blobel, 2009; van der Linden, et al., 2009).  
 
The reason for the disclosure of information is an important element in defining an efficient 
security strategy. Detailed and grained information is normally required to offer primary services 
such as the treatment of a subject of care. On the contrary, information required for secondary 
uses should not be linkable to the patient (Agrawala & Johnson, 2007). The destination of the 
information also affects the definition of a security strategy. Local security needs substantially 
vary from the requirement of a shared care scenario (van der Linden, et al., 2009). Locally, 
standard security measures and standardized messages allow the secure access and disclosure of 
information. However, the secure exchange and release of information among different health 
providers not only depends on secure and standardized electronic mechanisms but also on 
standardized security and access policies (Lopez & Blobel, 2009).  
 
 
 
PROTECTING PATIENT’S PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY  
Social, ethical and legal perspective 
 
The benefits of electronic health records and how the use of this technology could impact in 
society are still open for debate. Nonetheless, the general perception is that incorporating EHRs to 
medical practice provides support in the delivery of health care by facilitating access to historical 
medical data (Agrawala & Johnson, 2007; Anderson, 2007). EHRs provide an instrument to 
maintain non-fragmented and actualized health information.  
 
The information collected in EHRs has a historical character and correspond to the lifelong 
medical records of an individual. A perfect EHR would be a complete health history of the 
patient’s encounters with health system (Berner, 2008). However, having the complete medical 
history raises concerns over how the confidentiality of the information would be protected. 
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Traditionally, protecting the confidentiality of the information has been the responsibility of the 
physician and/or the institution that holds the patient’s medical records. In a shared care setting, 
the provision of health care services becomes a multitask activity in which the interaction of 
multiple actors is required not only for providing health care but also in protecting the 
confidentiality of health records.  
 
Under this complex scenario countries such as U.S., Canada, Japan and the member of the 
European Union have incorporated laws and regulations that aim to reduce fraud and abuse as 
well as protect patients’ information (Anderson, 2007). International regulations such as that 
imposed by HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) and the European Data 
Protection Directive (Agrawala & Johnson, 2007; Lusignan, et al., 2007) demand the highest 
level of security and protection during the access, processing and exchange of information that 
involve sensitive data of individuals. Australia also possesses a set of privacy principles that 
regulates the collection, use and disclosure of personal information. Additionally, Australian 
legislation protects and provides a legal body for people that have suffered harm as a product of 
unauthorized disclosure or use of private information.  
 
Challenges of Securing Electronic Health Records 
 
Securing electronic health records, in a scenario where information is potentially accessed by 
multiple actors, could become a complex and costly activity. To provide a framework for secure 
maintenance and release of health care information, the European Committee for Standardization 
has released a set of information security standards for health information systems (CEN-ENV, 
2000a, 2000b, 2000c). CEN standards recognize four global security needs that any health 
information system should accomplish Availability, confidentiality, integrity and accountability 
(CEN-ENV, 2000a).  
 
Availability of the information is a key factor for functional electronic health record systems; 
users with the right to access information should be allowed to do so in order to perform their 
duties.  However, to protect the confidentiality of the information, access to patient’s data should 
be carried out under the principles of relevance and need-to-know (Garson & Adams, 2008). The 
principle of relevance prevents the information overload and protects the patient’s privacy by 
restricting the release of information to the relevant data required to support the health care 
process (Berner, 2008; van der Linden, et al., 2009). In the same way, the principle of “need-to-
know” guarantees that only personnel who required the information and have the access 
privileges will be allowed to extract the data. Defining the correct balance between availability 
and security requirement of information is a critical goal in a complex environment such as health 
care. 
 
A security breach poses a threat for protecting the integrity of electronic health records as well 
as for providing reliable information for accountability purposes. Integrity of the information is 
not only guaranteed by incorporating additional security mechanisms within the system or for 
securing a communication channel, when information is exchanged between systems, but also by 
ensuring that only authorized user can have access, add or alter stored data. In shared care 
environment controlling who is accessing the information turns into complex and time demanding 
task. Indeed, the solo fact that existing authentication methods, such as PIN or passwords, allows 
unauthorized delegation of access permissions threaten the integrity and validity of the 
information (Heckle & Lutters, 2007; Shin, et al., 2008). Accountability of information also 
becomes less accurate when non-authorized users are able to access and manipulate data 
regardless of the fact that they do not have the privileges to execute such activities.  
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Analysis of traditional methods 
 
In a shared care context the concepts of privacy, confidentiality, and security become essential for 
secure exchange of electronic health records. To provide a secure, safe and reliable environment 
for co-operation and communication, several security requirements need to be taken into 
consideration.  Security may not only consider the services that will be implemented to avoid the 
unauthorized access to sensitive information but also mechanisms that prevent unauthorized 
release of patient’s data.  
 
Existing authentication and access control models require safekeeping PINs, passwords or 
smartcards in order to provide access to restricted facilities and information. However the nature 
of the activities executed by physicians and medical personnel requires mobility and multiple 
accesses to different terminal within the organization or even remotely in the case of web based 
health information systems or integrated multi-domain systems (Garson & Adams, 2008; Shin, et 
al., 2008). Considering that access to different systems may require multiple authentication 
methods, it is usual to find that PINs and passwords are maintained stored on the computer 
terminals used by physicians, stick papers on the office, laboratories, medical consult or at home, 
or become a simple combination of well known numbers or digits such as phone extension, date 
of birth or pseudonyms which are easy to remember but also relatively less efficient in avoiding 
security breaches  (Garson & Adams, 2008; Shin, et al., 2008). The use of smartcards also may 
present certain disadvantages such as deterioration and accidental lost. Additionally, if physicians 
forget their PIN/passwords or misplace their smartcards a reissuance process must take place 
(Shin, et al., 2008). Consequently, existing models become inappropriate and less reliable for a 
medical environment.  
 
Other issue associated to the use of traditional model is medical disputes generated by 
delegation of authentication codes (Chen, et al., 2008; Heckle & Lutters, 2007). Delegation of 
private authentication codes is generated when a member of a hospital’s medical staff delegates 
his PIN/password or other authentication feature to other physician or nurse to access, modify or 
add information on behalf of the owner of the private authentication codes (Heckle & Lutters, 
2007; Shin, et al., 2008). The delegation of access rights may grant access to sensitive 
information to non-authorized user by breaking established policies of information privacy and 
confidentiality (Heckle & Lutters, 2007; Shin, et al., 2008). This also may have legal 
repercussions when restricted information is leaked to third parties without the proper 
authorization of the patient or when the addition of erroneous information compromises the safety 
of patients. 
 
Traditional Access control models 
 
In the following pages traditional access control models, such as DAC, MAC, RBAC, will be 
presented. In order to do so, a paradigm will be used (see Figure 1), where a doctor needs to 
acquire information regarding a patient’s medical history from another institutions in order to 
handle the patient’s case. Figure 2 presents a graphical representation of the relation and flow of 
information of the actors historically involved in the treatment of patient A described in Figure 1. 
The paradigm used presents difficulties that arise in providing health care in today’s 
interconnected medical environments. These difficulties require efficient access control 
mechanisms in order to ensure security, for example, in the scenario discussed only doctor ‘DC’ 
who has the patient’s consent accesses the patient’s medical data. Traditional access control 
models try to cope with these kinds of difficulties giving access to a patient’s EHR only to the 
rightful owner. 
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68 years old lady 'A' was admitted to the hospital 'HA' with abdominal pain and 
doctor 'DC' has been assigned to her case.  The patient has indicated having a history 
of chronic diseases. 'A' has been previously hospitalized at hospital 'HB' for chest 
pain and followed up treatment with the cardiologist 'C' for Atrial Fibrillation, 
Hypertension and Recurrent Angina, also radiological information of the patient are 
maintain in the hospital records.  Additionally, she has been diagnosed with diabetes 
for 20 years and has been visiting clinic 'CL' for her regular medical treatment. She 
has checked her blood according to the doctor's order at the local pathology 'P' 
regularly. 'A' has also been seen by the Dietitian 'D', Ophthalmologist 'O', podiatrist 
'PO', Exercise Physician 'EX' for her diabetes and diabetes related complications. 
She visited gynecologist 'G' for postmenopausal symptoms 2 years back and had an 
episode of knee pain 3 weeks ago having taken an x'ray at the Radiology  'R'. She is 
on several medications for different conditions. As an elderly lady with multiple 
pathologies, the doctor 'DC' has decided to trace back her history from her healthcare 
providers.  The patient has also given consent for the doctor to do that. 
 
Figure 1: Case Analysis 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Case analysis, interaction and expected flow of information 
 
 
Mandatory Access control  
 
Mandatory access control polices (MAC) govern access based on classification of subjects and 
objects within a system. The access control decision is made by a centralized authority that 
determine, on one hand, the level of security required for each object and, on the other hand, the 
trustworthiness level of subjects for accessing the protected information (R. S. Sandhu & 
Samarati, 1994). Access control is based on comparing security levels, which indicate how 
sensitive data is and is performed by assessing security clearances, which indicate the entities that 
are allowed to access such data. To access the information a subject should have at least a level of 
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security clearance equal to the security level of the object being accessed (Stallings & Brown, 
2008). MAC policies established that users cannot delegate access rights in this way enforcing 
protection of the data “level”, this guarantees the confidentiality of the accessed data (Stallings & 
Brown, 2008). MAC policies also allow the establishment of fine-grained access rights over data 
and, at the same time, reinforce established access restrictions. However, MAC policies are rather 
rigid which make them unsuitable for a shared care environment, especially considering that in 
MAC more than one security level cannot be assigned to the same data object (Hafner et. all, 
2008).  
 
For example, in our previous mentioned paradigm, a situation where information of patient 'A' 
is maintained under MAC policies, doctor 'DC' will be required to provide the necessary 
clearances to retrieve the data from clinic 'CL' and hospital HB information systems. In this case, 
the data fields confining patient 'A' information would be maintained labelled with different 
levels of security accordant with the sensitivity of the information. Doctor 'DC' would be able to 
retrieve the data that reflect the access right provided by the clearances that he possesses. In fact, 
to maintain the principles of need-to-know and relevance 'DC' would only have access to the 
relevant information needed to perform the task. However, a physician with the same security 
clearances to 'DC' would also be allowed to access the retrieved data, which would not reflect the 
consent provided by patient 'A' to doctor 'DC'.  MAC policies are centered on the level of 
sensitivity of the information rather that rights and permissions that users or user groups have to 
access the data, which does not allow discriminating among users with the same clearances.  
 
Furthermore, in a shared care context where data can be exchanged between multiple 
organizations, delegated and accessed by multiple users in a need-to-know base, users can play 
different roles and have access to information under different contexts  (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 
2008). However, delegation of information and establishing hierarchies of access permissions are 
not allowed by MAC policies. In general, although MAC policies are less complex to define and 
allow the establishment of fine-grained access permissions based on the sensitivity of the 
information, they are extremely rigid for a health care environment, especially in managing users 
and user groups and delegation of access permissions (Hafner, Memon, & Alam, 2008) 
 
 
Discretionary access control 
 
Discretionary access control (DAC) is based on the identity of the requestor (user or system 
process) and on access rules, which establishes what the requestor is allowed to do. Access will 
be granted to the user accordantly to the permissions that the user has over the object at the 
moment of accessing it. DAC policies allow users to provide access permissions to another entity 
(user or system process). However, they do not impose restriction on how information will be 
managed when it is received by a user. In fact, a user could pass the data to another user not 
authorized to access it.   
 
A key element of DAC is the ownership of the information, especially because owners are 
allowed to grant access to the stored data. However, in health care ownership of the information 
is not always clear. In fact, EHRs belong to a patient but are created and modified by health care 
professionals and the information is not only shared but also could be maintained by different 
health organizations which could claim ownership of the data (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2008; Hafner, 
et al., 2008). Considering the situation of patient 'A', the data retrieved by doctor 'DC' from clinic 
'CL' and Hospitals 'HA' and 'HB' correspond to her personal health information; however 
ownership of the data is not clear. In the case of patient ‘A’, contents of her electronic health 
records have been created and accessed by physicians of the three organizations as well as 
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information has been collected from other external sources (radiology results and postmenopausal 
symptoms in the case of clinic 'CL'). Additionally, patient 'A' electronic health records is 
distributed in the information systems of all three organizations that, in principle, would have 
different access principles and security policies. The example shows that information could be 
created by various collaborative partners that could not claim complete ownership of the data. 
 
Although, access policies are flexible, the model lacks the ability of supporting dynamic 
change of access rights. Additionally, fined grained access privileges are difficult to be managed, 
especially when users are allowed to grant access right to other users. DAC is centered in users 
rather than user groups; however, if the model is extended by including categories or group 
definitions, group management is possible. 
 
In general, DAC policies are less complex to implement if compared to RBAC, they are also 
flexible but still restricted for a shared care environment and increase the complexity of defining 
fine-grained access to stored data.  Implementing DAC in shared care settings could result in 
additional security problems (R. S. Sandhu & Samarati, 1994; Stallings & Brown, 2008).  
 
 
Role-based access control and exchange of EHRs 
 
Most of the existing researches consider role-based access control (RBAC) as a mechanism to 
guarantee authorized access to electronic health resources, especially during the exchange of 
EHRs. Role-based access control (RBAC) is used to protect information resources from 
unauthorized access based on the roles that user could have or perform within an organization. 
RBAC was first introduced by David Ferraiolo and Richard Kuhn in 1992 as a mean to provide 
manageable access privileges to identifiable groups of users (Ferraiolo & Kuhn, 1992). The 
Ferraiolo-Kuhn model was later integrated with the framework proposed by Sandhu et al.(R. S. 
Sandhu, Coynek, Feinsteink, & Youmank, 1996) and published as the NIST RBAC model in 
2000 (R. Sandhu, Ferraiolot, & Kuhnt, 2000). The integrated framework proposed by Ferraiolo, 
Sandhu and Richard was adopted as ANSI/INCITS standard in 2004. 
 
The central idea of the RBAC model is that users can perform multiple roles and roles can be 
associated to multiple access permissions. In RBAC permissions are represented by the relation 
existing between resources and operations over those resources (Lee, Kim, Kim, & Yeh, 2004). 
In practice, RBAC models are based on access policies defined in terms of permissions that are 
associated with roles assigned to users. Permissions will determinate the operations that a role is 
able to perform on information resources and, therefore, all users that have assigned that specific 
role (Kim, Ray, France, & Li, 2004).  
 
Even though the RBAC model has been successfully implemented in several domains, in the 
healthcare it presents several issues that need to be considered. Some of these issues are described 
in the following situations which are described using the case presented in Figure 1. 
 
Roles definitions 
 
Role can be defined based on the structure of the organization or functions that performs 
members within the organization. This could lead to an ambiguous definition of access 
permission that can generate security issues when information is exchanged among organizations. 
Since in RBAC models operations are generically assigned to roles, it is difficult to separate into 
individual access permissions. However, when the patient 'A' is admitted to 'HA', the assignation 
of the access permission is done based on the consent given by the patient and not by the access 
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privileged that could be associated to roles. For example, the patient will be treated by 
Cardiologist 'CA-A' but not the Cardiologist 'CA-B'. Therefore, even though both Cardiologists 
could have the same role, only cardiologist attending A should be allowed to access the patient’s 
information.  Furthermore, in a shared care environment the team of physicians taking care of 
patient A should be the only ones with access to his medical records. In this case roles are not 
sufficient to determine access privileges, but the function of the physician within the team or been 
part of the team. In reality access to the health information is given to the members of the 'team' 
treating the patient and not to all physicians with similar roles within the organization. Under 
these conditions, role-base access control will not provide a suitable solution to the problem of 
restricting access to those users that are not taking part of the patient treatment. 
 
Since in role-based access control models access permissions are determined by the role assigned 
to a user, the control that the patient has over the access to specific and sensitive information will 
be intrinsically limited. In fact, in a conventional RBAC model patient A would not control 
whatsoever over permission assigned to his medical records. 
 
 
Combining and extending Access control models 
 
Alhaqbani and Fidge proposed a security access control protocol based on a three level access 
security model (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2008). The proposed protocol combines Discretionary 
Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Role-Based access control in 
hierarchically layered security mechanism, which determine access to data depending on a set of 
rules and policies evaluated at each level. According to the access hierarchy of the model, access 
to sensitive information will be determined by a Mandatory Access Control Policy, which 
provides a solution to the previously described scenario. However, implementation of this model 
in a shared care environment would be rather complex. The complexity of EHRs would limit the 
usability of DAC in a shared care setting since role definition can differ among health providers. 
Moreover, the complexity of all models could be reduced by reinforcing the policy that 
allows/restrict access to information stated as sensitive. 
 
Motta and Furuie proposed a Contextual Role-Based Access Control (C-RBAC) model which 
extends the conventional RBAC definitions by including contextual information to determine 
access permissions to patients’ data (Motta & Furuie, 2003). In this case, the model allows the 
statement of pacific restriction by adding contextual data to restrict the access to the information. 
Context information such as physicians assessing of patient, location and time can be used to 
determine if a user can be granted with access to information. The model was developed to be 
flexible in granting fine-grained access privileges in large health care centers using RBAC. 
Nonetheless, its definition and structure limits the model to local environments, which made the 
model unsuitable for shared care environments with participation of multiple health care 
providers.  
 
Peleg et. al proposed a solution based on contextual RBAC which considers definition of 
scenarios, which are called situations, in which user would be allowed to access EHRs. Situations 
are described and classified, and each classification would define a pattern that can be applied 
when a user is requesting access to information (Peleg, Beimel, Dori, & Denekamp, 2008). The 
Situation Role-Based Access Control (S-RBAC) model could also be used to manage access 
permissions over remote repositories by applying patterns that define situations in which inter-
institutional exchange of information is allowed. However, the model was developed using a 
patient centric approach which did not directly consider requirements of all possible stakeholders. 
Additionally, since the model is based on RBAC, conflicting roles and access policies would be 
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expected when data is exchanged among different health care providers, which will increase the 
complexity in defining situational patterns for data exchange and release. Also, if additional 
health providers and all possible stakeholders scenarios are described and included, the number of 
pattern would potentially increase as well as the complexity of managing access permissions.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of access control policies 
 
 MAC DAC RBAC C-RBAC S-RBAC 
Complexity Low Low Medium High High 
Multiple 
users 
Restricted Restricted Possible Possible Possible 
Policy 
management 
Rigid/Restricted Flexible/Restricted Applicable Applicable Applicable 
Fine-Grained 
access 
Applicable Restricted Restricted Applicable Applicable 
Pros Guarantees 
protection over 
accessed data 
 
Allow Fine-Grained 
access restrictions 
Policies are Flexible  Allows management 
of access right at 
group level 
 
Facilitate the 
management of 
access right in large 
organizations 
Considers the 
contextual 
information to 
determine fine-
grained access to 
medical records 
Considers the 
contextual 
information to 
determine fine-
grained access to 
medical records 
 
Is designed for share 
care settings 
Cons Protection policies 
are centered on the 
information rather 
that user or user 
groups. 
 
Difficult to 
implement in large 
organization with 
multiple user and 
groups accessing the 
data 
Establishment of 
ownership over the 
data is rather difficult 
in shared care 
environments. 
 
The model lack the 
ability to support 
dynamic change of 
access right 
 
It is limited and 
difficult to manage in 
a shared care 
scenarios 
Lacks the ability to 
specify fine-grained 
access right for users 
 
Constraints are not 
flexible 
 
Different role 
definitions could be 
present when 
information is 
exchange among 
health providers 
Is not designed for 
share care settings 
Model is patient is 
mainly patient 
centered, and does 
not consider all 
stakeholders 
 
Level of complexity 
potentially increase 
with the inclusion of 
additional situations  
 
Different role 
definitions could be 
present when 
information is 
exchange among 
health providers 
 
 
Attribute-Based Encryption 
 
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) has its origins in Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) schemes, 
firstly proposed in (Boneh & Franklin, 2001). The IBE scheme allows a sender to encrypt a 
message using an identity without incorporating a public key infrastructure (Sahai & Waters, 
2005; Shamir, 1985). In this case, the identity is viewed as a string of characters (e.g. user’s 
name, an email address, or telephone number) which serves as a user’s public key (Liu, Guo, & 
Zhang, 2009). A private key, which is provided by a trusted private key generator (PKG), is used 
to decrypt the data. The private key is provided only if the user has been successfully identified 
by the PKG (Au, et al., 2008) 
 
Sahai and Waters (Sahai & Waters, 2005, 2008) introduced the notion of attribute-based 
encryption (ABE) as a new mechanism for reinforcing access control. The attribute-based 
encryption approach allows a ciphertexts to be decrypted by more than one recipient, unlike the 
traditional public key cryptography methods (Bethencourt, Sahai, & Waters, 2007). In its place, 
both the users’ private keys and ciphertexts are associated with a set of attributes or policies that 
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are used to grant access to the encrypted data. Attributes are defined as set of strings, in this case 
represented by access policies, which are associated to an access structure applied to the 
encrypted data. A user would be able to decrypt an encrypted data only if he/she possesses a 
private key with attributes that overlap the attributes used in the ciphertext (Bethencourt, et al., 
2007; Ibraimi, Tang, Hartel, & Jonker, 2009). In other words, to allow a user to decrypt a 
ciphertext, at least k attributes must overlap between the identity used to generate the ciphertext 
and his private keys. Note that not all but k attributes are sufficient to grant access to the 
encrypted data, which is represented as an error-tolerance in the model (Sahai & Waters, 2008). 
This error-tolerance allows the implementation of Fuzzy Identities or Attribute-Based Encryption 
schemes for biometric technology (Sahai & Waters, 2005). 
 
In this section, we will present and describe an Attribute-Based Encryption scheme and how it 
can be applied to protect the information of parties during the exchange and release of EHRs. 
 
 
An approach for securing EHRs exchange and applications 
 
Considering the case in Figure 1, Hospitals 'HA', 'HB' and Clinic 'CL' have previously agreed in a 
set of principles that allow them the exchange of information. Those principles have been set on 
contracts that permit the transference of any relevant data regarding health history which can be 
required during the treatment of a patient. All institutions have defined independent security 
approaches and mechanism for protecting the information that is managed on their system, HA 
and HB being public hospitals and according to the health policy guidelines for a public hospital, 
CL, being a General Practice, following the guideline for security from the General Practice 
Computing Group. Therefore, there could be differences in access control, security and 
information release polices. To avoid controversies policy reinforcing method is used during the 
exchange and release of information. The method proposed is reinforcing security policies by 
using attribute-based encryption scheme. In this case, the access policies are used to encrypt the 
information that has been exchanged, allowing only users with the correct access privileges to 
decrypt and access the information. 
 
Data Encryption 
 
Considering the scenarios described previously, the exchanged information is maintained 
encrypted until an authorized user, with the sufficient k attributes, proceeds to decrypt the 
message completely or partially. In this case, a secret key, SK, is used to decrypt the ciphertext 
encrypted with the initial attribute set (access policies), Ap, if and only if the attributes that the 
user possesses are sufficient as measured by the “set overlap” distance metric for the security 
policies used to encrypt the data (Sahai & Waters, 2005). To decrypt the message, a private key is 
also needed. The scheme requires of a trusted authority, known as the Private Key Generator 
(PKG), with the task of generating the private key (SK). The PKG will provide such a private key 
only after the user has been successfully identified (Au, et al., 2008). The generated key can then 
be used to decrypt the ciphertext originally received from the sender (see Figure 3). In the 
following, k denotes the minimal number of attributes that the user must have in order to decrypt 
the message or part of it. 
 
This approach guarantees that only users that have access privileges would be allowed to 
access the encrypted data. The access privileges are described by the security policies used to 
encrypt the data. A user that does not have the attributes required to decrypt the data will not be 
able to access the information. If the security policies attached are hierarchically associated to 
information, the access could be provided at different levels for different users. In this case, user 
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will be able to access different level or contents within the encrypted data depending on the 
attributes associated to their access privileges.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Attribute-based encryption 
 
 
Enforcing of access control policies and secure transference of data 
 
Information exchange 
 
After patient A is admitted to hospital 'HA' and her first encounter with physician 'DC', doctor 
'DC' starts recollecting patient 'A' historical medical data. The recollection starts with the remote 
request of data from clinic 'CL' and hospital 'HB' health information systems. To guarantee the 
confidentiality of the information, the data is encrypted using attributes associated to physician 
'DC'. Since the transference of data is done by reinforcing access policies only doctor 'DC' will 
initially be authorized to decrypt the data provided by clinic 'CL' and hospital 'HB'. Considering 
that patient 'A' will not only be treated by physician 'DC' but also by a team of physicians and 
medical staff, the access permissions will eventually be modified in order to provide access to all 
personnel involved in with patient’s 'A' care. This can be done by providing a private Key to each 
member of the staff assuming responsibility with patient’s 'A' care; each member will be allowed 
to retrieve the information depending on the described access policies described by the attributes 
associated to their private keys. For example, physician treating patient 'A' will have access to all 
relevant medical history of the patient, on the contrary nurses and administrative staff would be 
provided with restricted access to the data. 
 
Encounter
Consent
Information
Access
Information 
Request
MedicalStaff
Doctor DC
Patient
<<Include>>
 
Figure 4: Case use Scenario 1 
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Analysis  
 
This case presents a normal patient-physician encounter in which the historical information of 
patient A can only be accessed by the primary physician at hospital 'HA' by Doctor 'DC'. To 
simplify the analysis let us assume that the consent policy has been created during the first 
encounter (steps 1 and 2 in Figure 6). As it has been described previously, the policy defines a set 
of attributes that establishes who would be able to access the medical information of patient A. In 
this case a set of attributes ({Pat.A},{Doc.GP, Clinic.CL}) is used to describe the access 
permission to patient A’s information.  
 
Even when the patient has progressed through the health system, the information gathered 
from the counter, encounters and reports can be shared using electronic communication. An 
information request made by doctor DC would start the process as shown in steps 3 and 4 of 
Figure 6. The information in the EHRs of hospital 'HB' and clinic 'CL' can be encrypted using the 
attributes ({Pat.A},{ Doc.DC, Depto.ME, Hosp.HA }) and send directly to the electronic health 
record system in hospital HA, which is shown in steps 5 and 6 of Figure 6. In this case the access 
policy for the data is described as M(data)= (Pat.A)   (Doc.DC  Depto.ME  Hosp.HA). Since 
patient cannot possess a private key that includes the attributes {Doc.DC, Depto.ME, Hosp.HA } 
the access tree has only two possible outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 5: Access tree Patient’s Data 
 
In this scenario, the transfer of information is directly managed between sender ('HB' and 'CL' 
information systems) and receiver (Doctor 'DC'). Since the information is shared between 
organizations the attribute { Doc.DC, Depto.ME, Hosp.HA } is applied to encrypt the relevant 
medical information associated to patient A, and then sent to the HA’s information system. 
 
Patient
CL Information
System
HB Information
System
HA information
System
Doctor DC1: Encounter
2: Consent(): {Doc.DC,Hosp.HA}
3: Information Request1
5: M1(data)(): {Pat.A},{Doc.Dc,Dept.ME,Hosp.HA}
4: Information Request2
6: M2(data)(): {Pat.A},{Doc.Dc,Dept.ME,Hosp.HA}
8: Patient data
7: Access(): {Doc.Dc,Dept.ME,Hosp.HA}
 
Figure 6: Sequence Diagram Scenario 1 
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The information collected and sent directly to the 'HA' systems, can be accessed by 'DC', as it 
is illustrated in steps 7 and 8 of Figure 6. At this point, the transferred data has been protected 
using an enforced access policy approach; therefore the information can only be accessed by 
Doctor 'DC'. To provide access to other members of the staff access permissions can be modified 
by associating new access key to the encrypted data. For example, by allowing Cardiology 'CA-
A' to have access the patient medical history. This delegation of access to specific users is 
possible because attribute-based encryption supports partial delegation of access permissions. To 
enforce that only 'CA-A' is able to access the data the information the following attributes will be 
incorporated to the access permissions ({ Doctor.DC, Depto.ME}). 
 
Access delegation and patient control over data access 
 
Now consider the situation presented in role definition. According to the access and security 
policies of hospital 'HA' only member of the team attending the patient can have access to his 
EHRs. Since originally the information was requested and collected by doctor 'DC' of Medicine 
department the data could be encrypted using the flowing attribute set M(data)= (Pat.A)   
(Doctor.DC Depto.ME). However, to allow other physicians access to patients 'A' data, a new 
set of attributes need to be incorporated. In this case, physicians could be provided with private 
key and assume specific responsibilities, which are described by a specific set of attributes 
(policies). Additionally, information could restrict in some specific cases, which can be described 
by a specific set of attributes (policies). Each specialist will be able to decrypt the data, which is 
under his responsibility, but will not be able to decrypt the data that has been restricted. This 
provides a solution for restricting access only to members of the team treating the patient and to 
patient’s control over access permissions. 
 
Analysis 
 
Initially only doctor 'DC' has access to the patient information. To allow access to cardiology 
'CA-A' a new set attribute can be added to the access policy of patient 'A', the new set will 
incorporate attributes set associated to 'CA-A'. Since cardiology 'CA-A' works the Cardiology 
department of hospital 'HA', the new set of attributes would be M(data)= (Pat.A)   (Doctor.DC 
Depto.ME)   (Doctor.CA-A Depto.CAR). No other cardiologist will have the attributes 
{Doctor.CA-A,Depto.CAR} associated to their access privileges, therefore no one else but CA-A 
will be allowed to access and manipulate patients 'A' data. The new access tree has only three 
possible outcomes: 
 
 
Figure 7: Access tree considering access to cardiologist CA-A 
 
When patient A provides consent to Doctor 'DC' to collect his historical medical information, 
he could state that only physician involved in his case would have access to his psychiatric 
history, denying access to other physicians and personnel of hospital 'HA'. In this case the access 
Key of other physicians and personal will not allow them to access to the psychiatric history of 
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patient 'A'. the access to the information is stated according to the consent of the patient and the 
access policies. The access then will incorporate the restrictions over information access, making 
some of the information unable to access for other physicians even when they could have access 
to the patient’s EHR. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Health information systems, in special Electronic Health Record (EHR), are considered crucial 
sources of information for healthcare professionals and an essential instrument for delivery of 
health care services. Nevertheless, the level of accessibility provided by health information 
systems raises concern over the secure access and release of information, especially in share care 
environments. In shared care context protecting the confidentiality of patients become the focus 
of attention and a key element to be considered in the implementation of information interfaces 
for data exchange among health care providers. Functional and reliable inter-domain EHRs 
require the consideration shared concepts as well as standardized terminology and standardized 
information architectures.  
 
At the application level, the main security issue presented in approaches based on MAC and 
DAC approaches are inflexibility of the policies, complexity in determining ownership of the 
information, difficulty in implementing on large shared care environments and restriction 
considering delegation and hierarchical access permissions to the data. Implementation based on 
RBAC models present security issues associated to the ambiguities that exist in the definition of 
roles and access privileges among organizations, the non-existence of a common and/or 
standardized framework for defining roles and access privileges, lacking the ability of fine-
grained access to information. Extensions to RBAC have allowed the fine-grained definition of 
access rights to data but at the same time increased the complexity of the models. The proposed 
approaches have failed to provide suitable solutions for exchange of date in scenarios that involve 
more than one health care provider. 
 
In this chapter, we presented a security approach which reinforces access policies using 
attribute-based encryption schemes. Attribute-based encryption allows the encryption decryption 
of data based on polices, which are represented as attributes associated to the information. The 
approach allows an independent but secure method to protect the privacy and confidentiality of a 
patient information transmitted over insecure channels. The model is flexible in providing access 
to multiple users based on security policies, which describe the access permissions over encrypted 
data. The use of attribute-based encryption allows: 
 
1. Control over access permissions of transmitted data: only user with the private access key 
that satisfy the encryption protocol will be able to decrypt the exchange information. 
 
2. Delegation of access permission: Access to information can be delegated/granted to other 
users by providing an access key which satisfies the encryption protocols. 
 
3. Protection of the patient’s data: the transmitted information is encrypted in a fashion in 
which only users with the appropriate key will be able to decrypt the information. In 
addition, data can only be accessed when a user possesses the appropriate access 
permissions, and information is provided considering the principles of need-to-know and 
relevance. 
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4. Hierarchical access to rumpled data: User can access the complete information or part of 
it, depending of the attribute set associated to the private key. 
 
In conclusion, attribute-based encryption offers several security advantages over traditional 
methods and also can be used for different purposes. In fact, it provides a flexible access control 
mechanism that can be implemented under different circumstances. Future work in this area is to 
explore and provide a suitable and scalable solution for complex health care environment. The 
complexity of modern EHR systems require flexible solutions that can be adapted in a variety of 
settings. In addition, the growing quantity and variety of the information collected by EHR 
systems along its potential uses demand scalable solutions. Moreover, in a shared care 
environment the number of interconnected systems and the potential numbers of users increase 
the demand for secure mechanisms that can cope with an increasing need for highly sensitive 
information.   
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